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Brexit and EU Financial Governance: Business as Usual or Institutional Change? 
 
Abstract  
This article considers the implications of Brexit for EU financial governance. It first examines the 
implications for regulation. Drawing on the political economy of EU financial regulation and 
considering the UK’s generally facilitative and liberal approach, it predicts that a more 
interventionist period might follow Brexit. Major change in EU regulatory style is unlikely, 
however, not least given the influence of international financial governance on the EU.  
 
The article also considers the likely consequences for institutional governance and for the current 
uneasy arrangement, based on distinct euro area (Banking Union) and single market structures. It 
suggests that a strengthening of the European Supervisory Authorities is the most likely outcome 
and that functionally this involves the lowest risk. This strengthening is likely to be a function of 
a number of factors, including the greater prominence which the Authorities will have in relation 
to third country ‘equivalence’ assessments. The article also considers the conditions which may 
lead to a more radical re-organization of institutional governance and suggests that other 
environmental conditions, beyond Brexit, are likely to shape future developments.  
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Introduction 
Some six months on from the Brexit decision on 23 June 2016, the nature of the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU remains unclear. In the financial services sphere alone the questions are 
many and complex. How will the patchwork of ‘equivalence’ rules which currently governs 
(albeit to a limited and partial extent) third country access to the EU financial market apply to the 
UK, and might these rules change?1 What are the costs and benefits to the UK financial sector of 
the wide range of possible exit models – ranging from EEA membership to third country, non-
equivalent status?2 How might a transitional access arrangement work?3 This discussion 
addresses just one of the many questions. It takes an EU perspective and its concern is with EU 
financial governance, or the arrangements which support the regulation and supervision of the EU 
financial market: will Brexit lead to further change to how financial governance is designed?  
Certainly, the recent history of EU financial market governance has been punctuated by 
disruptive shocks which have led to major reforms. The 2008 financial crisis led to the 
construction of the highly detailed ‘single rulebook’ which now governs the EU financial market. 
It also led to the 2011 establishment of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) 
within which pan-EU supervisory coordination is managed through the three fast-maturing 
European Supervisory Authorities – the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the 
European Banking Authority (EBA), and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA). The 2010-2012 euro-area fiscal crisis (and the related existential threat to the 
euro) led to the construction of Banking Union and to related risk-sharing through the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SSM and 
SRM currently apply to euro area Member States although other Member States may join. 
Banking Union is continuing to evolve. In late 2015 the Commission presented a proposal for the 
‘third pillar’ of Banking Union – the mutualization of national deposit insurance schemes through 
a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS).4 Discussions are also underway on the long-
awaited ‘common fiscal backstop’ which is designed to provide funding support to Banking 
                                                 
1 For a review of the equivalence rules see Shearman and Sterling, “Brexit and Equivalence: Review of the 
Financial Services Framework Across All Sectors”, 10 August 2016 and for an assessment of the UK’s 
future as a third country see E. Ferran, “The UK as a Third Country in EU Financial Services Regulation”, 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 47/2016, SSRN, 
http://ssrn.com/absract=2844474 [Accessed 24 November 2016]. It has been reported that the current 
equivalence rules may be reviewed by the Commission: A. Barber and J. Brunsden, “EU review casts doubt 
on City’s hopes for ‘equivalence’ as Brexit last resort” Financial Times, 7 November 2016.  
2 See, e.g., Oliver Wyman, “The Impact of the UK’s Exit from the EU on the UK-Based Financial Services 
Sector”, 5 October 2016.  
3 Current indications suggest the UK will seek a transitional arrangement to avoid ‘cliff edge’ effects. 
4 Commission, “Proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme” COM(2015) 586, final. 
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Union banks in the event of a systemic banking crisis overwhelming the risk-reduction and risk-
sharing mechanisms of the SSM and SRM. 5  
The likelihood of a third re-setting shock seemed remote in early 2016. Despite ongoing 
difficulties with domestic banking markets, notably the Italian banking market,6 and persistent 
problems with non-performing loans in the euro area,7 the April 2016 reports from the European 
Commission and the ECB on the health of the EU financial system had a reassuring tone.8 They 
reported that financial stability was being restored and that levels of cross-border funding activity, 
while subdued, were recovering. The likelihood of a market shock and of related regulatory 
reform seemed small.  
The Brexit vote may, however, have marked the start of a third re-setting shock with 
lasting implications for how EU financial governance is organized. This short note speculates as 
to the potential consequences of the Brexit decision for EU financial governance, from 
regulatory, supervisory, and institutional perspectives.  
 
The UK and EU Financial Governance 
The design of EU financial governance, the extent to which it is centralized or decentralized, and 
the pace at which the financial integration project has been pursued are a function of how 
competing and powerful national, supranational, and private sector interests intersect.9 Chief 
among these interests are the national interests which are primarily expressed through ECOFIN 
Council negotiations.10 These national interests have been usefully characterized in the political 
economy literature in terms of ‘market-shaping’ and ‘market-making’ coalitions.11 The market-
making coalition in the Council has typically advocated for a style of EU financial market 
regulation which is facilitative and promotes liberalization; is broadly sympathetic to market 
                                                 
5 Commission, Communication, “On Steps Towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union” 
COM(2015) 600 final and ECOFIN Council, “Conclusions on a Roadmap to Complete the Banking 
Union”, Press Release 353/16 (17 June 2016). 
6 See e.g. R. Sanderson and C. Jones, “Essential Repairs”, Financial Times, 11 July 2016. 
7 The ECB issued draft Guidelines on the management by SSM banks of non-performing loans in 
September 2016: ECB, “Draft Guidelines to Banks on Non-Performing Loans.” 
8 Commission, “European Financial Stability and Integration Review” (2016) ((SWD) 2016 146) and ECB, 
“Financial Integration in Europe” (2016). 
9 D. Mügge, “The Political Economy of Europeanized Financial Regulation” (2013) 20(3) Journal of 
European Public Policy 458 
10 For a recent assessment in the context of Capital Markets Union see L. Quaglia, D. Howarth, and M. 
Liebe, “The Political Economy of European Capital Markets Union” (2016) 54 (S1) J.C.M.S. 185. 
11 L. Quaglia, “The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the EU” (2012) 17(4) New 
Political Economy 515. 
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intermediation;12 privileges transparency and disclosure techniques over behavioural regulation 
where possible; is open to market substitutes for intervention; and advocates for national 
discretion, particularly where fiscal risks are high. The market-shaping coalition has a stronger 
regulatory bias; can be suspicious of intense levels of market intermediation; is often wary of 
market substitutes for regulatory intervention; promotes harmonization over national discretion; 
and is more open to risk-sharing through institutional design.   
The UK has been a leading member of the market-making coalition. Over the financial 
crisis, the UK advocated for greater national discretion under the pivotal 2013 Capital 
Requirements Directive IV/Capital Requirements Regulation (CRD IV/CRR)13 - which provides 
the spine of the EU’s banking rulebook and implements the Basel III Accord - particularly with 
respect to the domestic application of capital and other supervisory tools to local risks to financial 
stability.14 Over the negotiations on CRD IV/CRR’s sister measure, the 2014 Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive II/Market in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFID 
II/MiFIR)15 which provides the spine of the EU’s investment services/trading rulebook, the UK 
was in the vanguard of the Council coalition which successfully protected a degree of Member 
State autonomy and industry choice in relation to the otherwise extensive transparency and other 
rules which apply to trading in financial instruments under MiFID II/MiFIR.16 Similarly, the UK 
has been a strong supporter of proportionality in the application of EU financial regulation. The 
UK’s Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulation Authority recently notified their 
intention not to comply with an element of EBA’s 2015 Guidelines on bank remuneration policies 
(as is their prerogative17), and to instead dis-apply, in pursuit of proportionality, a contested 
element of the Guidelines.18 To take a final example, the UK (presciently) has often argued for a 
facilitative approach to third country access to the EU financial market.19 It was influential during 
                                                 
12 Market intermediation refers to the process whereby actors in the financial markets ‘intermediate’ 
between suppliers and seekers of capital by, for example, providing risk management products and 
supporting trading in securities.  
13 Capital Requirements Directive 2013/36 [2013] OJ L176/338 (CRD IV) and Regulation 575/2013 [2013] 
OJ L176/1 (CRR). 
14 On the UK negotiating position see S. James, “The domestic politics of financial regulation: informal 
ratification games and the EU capital requirement negotiations” 21(2) New Political Economy (2016) 187.  
15 Directive 2014/65 [2014] OJ L173/349 (MiFID II) and Regulation 600/2014 [2014] OJ L173/84 
(MiFIR). 
16 On the negotiations see N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) pp. 456-457. 
17 European Supervisory Authority Guidelines to national supervisory authorities operate on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis. 
18 FCA and PRA, “Statement on Compliance with the EBA Guidelines on Sound Remuneration 
Principles”, February 2016. 
19 E. Ferran, “The UK as a Third Country” and L. Quaglia, “The Politics of ‘Third Country Equivalence’ in 
Post Crisis Financial Services Regulation in the European Union” (2015) 38 West European Politics 167.  
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the Council negotiations on the MiFID II/MiFIR market access regime, for example, and 
supported a more liberal approach to access to the EU investment fund market under the 2011 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive.20 The UK has, however, supported the single 
rulebook, given in particular the transaction cost reduction and risk management benefits which 
follow as well as the significant ‘passporting’ benefits for the City of London:21 once authorized 
in its home Member State (typically the State of registration), a financial actor registered in the 
EU can, under the financial ‘passport,’ provide services and establish branches cross-border 
without host State regulation or supervision, subject to some limited exceptions. Accordingly, at 
an early stage of the financial crisis reforms the UK Financial Services Authority suggested that 
as between ‘More Europe’ and ‘Less Europe’ the better choice was ‘More Europe’.22  
The UK has been much less accommodating of the harmonization of supervisory 
practices, and of the construction of related EU institutional structures for risk-sharing. It has 
typically regarded supervision as the prerogative of domestic supervisors, given the national 
fiscal risks which supervisory intervention in support of financial stability can generate. This 
opposition has often been expressed by means of the UK’s adherence to a strict interpretation of 
the Meroni ruling which limits the discretionary powers of EU agencies.23 The UK has, for 
example, generally favoured Commission control over the discretionary powers of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (as was the case over the Council negotiations on the crisis-era credit 
rating agency regime which confers exclusive supervisory powers over EU rating agencies on 
ESMA24) and has frequently argued against the conferral of direct supervisory powers on the 
Authorities. For example, it unsuccessfully resisted ESMA’s direct intervention powers in 
relation to short selling during the Council negotiations on the 2012 Short Selling Regulation,25 
and was also unsuccessful in its subsequent challenge before the Court of Justice of the EU of 
these powers on the grounds, inter alia, that they breached the Meroni conditions and were not 
based on a valid Treaty competence.26    
This suspicion towards institutional centralization has also shaped the UK’s interaction 
with recent euro area reforms. As Banking Union’s distinct euro area risk-sharing structures have 
                                                 
20 Directive 2011/61 [2011] OJ L174/1. On the two negotiations see Moloney, EU Securities and Financial 
Markets Regulation (2014), pp. 307-308 and 403-404 and E. Ferran, “After the Crisis: The Regulation of 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU” (2011) 12 European Business Organization Law Review 379. 
21 Which were highlighted in HM Treasury, “The Long Term Economic Impact of EU Membership and the 
Alternatives”, March 2016.  
22 Financial Services Authority, “The Turner Review. A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial 
Crisis,” March 2009, pp.100-105. 
23 Meroni v High Authority (9/56) [1957-1958 E.C.R 133. 
24 See Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (2014), pp. 997-998. 
25 Regulation 236/2012 [2012] OJ L86/1. 
26 UK v Council and Parliament (C-270/12) EU:C:2014:18; [2014] 2 C.M.L.R. 44. 
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developed, the UK has been the Council’s strongest advocate for single market interests to be 
protected against the risks of euro area caucusing; for the non-discrimination principle (Article 18 
TFEU) to be adhered to in relation to non-euro currencies; and in support of a multi-currency 
form of EU financial system integration and governance. As is clear from the now null and void 
February 2016 New Settlement,27 the UK has been in the vanguard of efforts to ensure single 
market financial governance is not dominated by euro area interests, experiences, and design 
preferences. The New Settlement stated, for example, that legal acts on the further deepening of 
the euro area must respect the single market. It also affirmed that (given the sensitivity of any 
further institutional centralization of supervision beyond banks and Banking Union) the 
implementation of ‘measures’ relating to the supervision or resolution of financial institutions and 
markets remained the preserve of non-euro-area Member States - unless they wished to join 
‘common mechanisms’ which might be developed by the euro area.  The UK was similarly the 
driving force behind the ‘double lock’ which applies to EBA Board of Supervisors decision-
making; the lock is designed to prevent euro area caucusing on the Board by requiring majorities 
from both Banking Union and non-Banking Union supervisors.28 To take a final example, the UK 
took a successful action against the ECB’s ‘location policy’ for central clearing counterparties 
(CCPs - a critical element of financial market infrastructure) on the grounds that the ECB’s 
requirement that certain CCPs be established in the euro area breached a number of Treaty 
provisions, including the non-discrimination principle.29   
 What, accordingly, might be the consequences of the removal of the distinctive UK voice 
from deliberations on EU financial governance? The question is all the more germane as EU 
financial governance, after years of crisis-driven reform, is at something of a cross-roads. From a 
regulatory perspective, the Capital Markets Union regulatory agenda30 is underway and the 
Commission’s wide-ranging review of the crisis-era regulatory reforms31 is progressing.  A 
swathe of reforms is in train in relation to banking regulation, designed to enhance risk reduction 
                                                 
27 Decision of the Heads of State or Government Meeting Within the European Council, Concerning a New 
Settlement for the United Kingdom with the European Union, European Council Meeting, 18 and 19 
February 2016 EUCO 1/16 (Annex 1).   
28 Regulation 1093/2010 [2010] OJ L331/12 (as revised), art. 44. On the UK position see House of 
Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Future of the European Union: UK government policy”, First 
Report of Session 2013-2014, 21 May 2013, para 12.   
29 UK v ECB (T-496/11) EU: T: 2015: 133; [2015] C.M.L.R. 8. 
30 Set out in Commission, Green Paper, “Building a Capital Markets Union” COM (2015) 63 final and 
Commission, “Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union” COM (2015) 468 final. See further N. 
Moloney, “Capital Markets Union: ‘Ever Closer Union’ for the EU Financial System?” (2016) 41 
European Law Review 307. 
31 See, e.g., Commission, “Call for Evidence. EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Services” 
September 2015. 
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and to support Banking Union as well as the single banking market more generally.32 How these 
projects fare will reveal much as to the future nature of EU financial regulation. From a 
supervisory and institutional perspective, the critical question relates to whether further risk-
sharing and the related construction of institutions (based on the Banking Union template) will 
occur. In particular, will the vision of a wider euro area ‘Financial Union’ which incorporates 
Banking Union and which was articulated in the summer 2015 Five Presidents’ Report,33 come to 
pass? The absence of the UK from both of these regulatory and supervisory/institutional debates 
is likely to have effects, although their scale is not yet clear. 
 
Regulatory Governance and Brexit  
From the regulatory governance perspective, Capital Markets Union (CMU), the ongoing ‘stock 
take’ of the crisis-era regulatory reforms, the array of proposals to finesse EU banking regulation, 
and the appropriate application of the proportionality principle in regulatory governance are the 
main current preoccupations of the EU. 
CMU, launched in September 2015, is designed to deepen EU capital markets and to 
reduce the EU’s current dependence on bank funding by promoting alternative, market-based 
funding sources, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  The CMU agenda 
contains a number of regulatory reform proposals which are designed to: increase funding choices 
for businesses; provide an appropriate regulatory environment for long-term and sustainable 
investment in infrastructure; increase choice for retail and institutional investors; enhance bank 
lending capacity; and bring down barriers across the 28 (27) national capital markets. The UK is 
the major centre for market-based funding in the EU, with particular strengths in alternative 
funding and in the funding of smaller firms34 as well as in relation to the professional over-the-
counter (OTC) markets which facilitate risk management and so support the funding markets. It 
accordingly has a strong interest in the CMU agenda and in ensuring the agenda retains its current 
facilitative approach.35 On Brexit the UK will no longer participate in CMU-related Council 
                                                 
32 A major package of reforms, covering CRD IV/CRR as well as the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (Directive 2014/59 [2014] OJ L173/190 and 
Regulation 806/2014 [2014] OJ L225/1) was announced by the Commission on 23 November 2016 
(Commission “Frequently Asked Questions: capital requirements and resolution framework amendments” 
MEMO/16/3840). 
33 Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Report by J.-C. Juncker, in close cooperation with 
D. Tusk, J. Dijsselbloem, M. Draghi, and M. Schulz (2015), p. 12. 
34 The UK is, e.g., the largest EU market for funding through ‘business angels’, venture capital, and private 
equity investment: Commission, 2016 European Financial Stability and Integration Report, p. 26. 
35 The current proposals for a new prospectus regime (governing the disclosures required when a company 
accesses the public funding markets: COM(2015) 583, final) and securitization regime (governing the 
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negotiations. But before then the UK’s influence will, as a matter of practical politics, be minimal 
– particularly as a euro area qualified majority vote is now in place on the Council. Might the 
nature of CMU accordingly change?  
First, might CMU lose traction?36 The scale of the project is becoming clear. The 
Commission has recently warned that an integrated European capital market demands the 
changing of longstanding behaviours and attitudes ‘which will require sustained application of 
effort and resources,’ while the ECB has highlighted that developing CMU requires changing 
long-run savings patterns, and asking savers to operate under different risk-return objectives, 
which is ‘notoriously difficult.’37 Given the significant policy effort required and the related 
demands on institutional and political capital, might the weakening of the UK’s position, and its 
ultimate absence, lead to a loss of political momentum?38  
It is unlikely that, without the UK voice, the CMU agenda will disappear entirely. The 
major bank-based economies of the EU (notably France and Germany) have strong market 
finance elements in that banks in these economies often have extensive market-based 
operations.39 Other euro area economies (notably Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) 
have, in relative terms, larger capital markets than the US.40 Significant political interest can 
accordingly be expected. The Commission also appears committed to the project,41 with its 
September 2016 report on CMU calling for an acceleration of the reform agenda.42  But the 
nature of the CMU reform may change in two ways.  
First, it may become more of a regulatory than a liberalization project and acquire a more 
intrusive ‘market-shaping’ quality. There may, for example, be less enthusiasm for the extensive 
investment fund market reforms which are of particular importance to the UK market,43 and 
                                                                                                                                                 
transformation of bank loans into marketable (‘securitized’) instruments (COM(2015) 472, final and COM 
(2015) 473, final), e.g., are facilitative in design, 
36 The fate of the CMU project post-Brexit has been canvassed extensively in the financial press. See, e.g., 
J. Brunsden and A. Barker, “City to be sidelined by capital markets union plan”, Financial Times, 30 June 
2016, and A. Mooney, “Fears Brexit will slow Capital Markets Union”, Financial Times, Fund 
Management Supplement, 18 July 2016. 
37 Commission, 2016 European Financial Stability and Integration Report, p. 25 and ECB, 2016 Financial 
Integration in Europe Report, p. 97. 
38 ESMA Chairman Maijoor warned prior to the Brexit vote that ‘if the biggest capital market of the EU 
would not be part anymore of that CMU, obviously that would be detrimental’: H. Jones, “Brexit would 
damage EU Capital Market Union: watchdog says” Reuters, 18 May 2016. 
39 I. Hardie, and D. Howarth, (eds), Market-based Banking and the International Financial Crisis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013).   
40 ECB, Financial Integration in Europe 2016, p. 96. 
41 The EU Commissioner with charge of CMU stated in the wake of the vote that CMU was needed ‘more 
than ever’: Commissioner Dombrovskis, “Remarks at the Atlantic Council”, 18 July 2016. 
42 Commission, “Capital Markets Union: Accelerating Reform” COM(2016) 601, final. 
43  J. Brunsden, “Brussels aims to knock down hedge fund barriers”, Financial Times, 3 June 2016. 
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which include liberating funds to engage in lending44 and removing the persistent cross-border 
barriers to fund marketing.45  While Ireland and Luxembourg, as major EU fund centres, are 
typically champions of fund reform, in the absence of the UK they may find it harder to build 
coalitions.  To take another example, while the securitization reforms, which are in part designed 
to enhance banks’ ability to lend to SMEs, had a speedy progression through the Council (where 
they were supported by the UK46), the European Parliament is proving to be more sceptical and 
interventionist.47 In the absence of a strong UK voice, trilogue discussions between the 
Commission, Council and European Parliament on the reforms could lead to a more restrictive 
approach, particularly given some evidence of growing French opposition.48   
Second, the CMU agenda may become entangled with (and slowed down by) institutional 
reforms for the euro area. There were already signs before the Brexit vote of CMU being 
harnessed to the ongoing efforts to ‘complete EMU’. As noted above, the 2015 Five Presidents’ 
Report called for a ‘Financial Union’, incorporating CMU and Banking Union, in order to 
complete EMU; the ECB has emphasized the importance of CMU in improving cross-border risk-
sharing and in making the financial system more resilient;49 and the Commission and ECOFIN 
Council have both linked CMU to the completion of EMU.50 CMU may accordingly change 
character from being multi-currency and market-opening in design (as sought by the UK) to 
becoming a euro area institutional construction project. This outcome may be all the more likely 
given the nullification of the New Settlement by the Brexit vote. The New Settlement recognized 
the possibility of ‘different paths of integration’ for all Member States. It also provided a political 
brake in relation to further euro area integration: if at least one Council Member State not 
participating in Banking Union indicated its reasoned opposition to the Council adopting a euro-
area-related measure under a QMV, a pathway for further discussion was provided. The 
                                                 
44 E.g., ESMA, “Opinion on Key Principles for a European Framework on Loan Origination by Funds” 
(ESMA/2016/196)(2016). 
45 Commission, “CMU Action on Cross-border Distribution of Funds (UCITS, AIF, ELTIF, EUVECA, and 
EUSEF) Across the EU” (2016). 
46 The Bank of England was an early supporter of the reforms: Bank of England and ECB, Discussion 
Paper, “The Case for a Better Functioning Securitization Market in the EU” (2014). 
47 In March 2016 the European Parliament refused to ‘fast-track’ the reforms, while the initial June 2016 
report by ECON Rapporteur Tsang on the reforms took a more restrictive approach than the Council to the 
new regime: Draft ECON Report PE583.961, 6 June 2016. 
48 European Parliament, “Briefing on EU Legislation in Progress: Common Rules and a New Framework 
for Securitization”, February 2016. 
49 ECB, 2016 Financial Integration in Europe Report, p. 56. 
50 Commission, 2015 Communication on Steps Towards Completing EMU and Council, “Conclusions on 
the Commission Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union” Press Release 79/15, 10 November 
2015. 
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likelihood of further risk-sharing and related institution-building in relation to the euro area 
capital market on Brexit is discussed further below. 
CMU aside, the absence/reduced influence of the UK could also have implications for the 
current review process. The Commission is engaging in a wide-ranging ‘stock take’ of the crisis-
era programme generally,51 and is also pursuing the different mandatory reviews required of 
specific crisis-era measures under their respective review clauses. The review of the pivotal 2012 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR),52 which has restructured derivatives markets 
in the EU, for example, was launched in 2015;53 the opening of the alternative investment fund 
market to third country access under the 2011 Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive is 
currently under review;54 while the behemoth MiFID II/MiFIR regime will be subject to review 
over 2020-2022, after the delayed start to its application in January 2018 (from January 2017).  
The UK could have been expected to have brought an empirically-informed and 
productively sceptical perspective to the review process, which might have provided a brake 
against the tendency of the EU to intensify financial regulation and the related level of 
harmonization during reviews. The 2016 response by HM Treasury to the Commission’s ‘stock 
take’, for example, is detailed, specific, and suggests a concern to calibrate and refine the 
financial regulatory regime.55 It highlighted, for example: inconsistencies in the disclosure 
regime; weaknesses in EU fund regulation which were limiting cross-border activity; inconsistent 
approaches to supervision across the single market; multiple barriers to entry; outdated rules; and 
the importance of the EU marketplace being open to the global financial market. The UK’s 
concerns are unlikely to be isolated, but the absence of the UK from the Commission’s review 
process makes it more likely that the review does not engage in the potentially disruptive reforms 
which may be necessary. 
The current reforms to EU banking regulation may also be shaped by Brexit. The 
package of reforms is designed to implement recent proposals by the Basel Committee and the 
Financial Stability Board. The UK is active in both of these fora and is unlikely to resist the 
related reforms. But the reforms also include EU-specific proposals. These include adjustments to 
the relevant international standards to reflect the EU market context. They also include a more 
intrusive approach to harmonization, notably a limitation of the discretion which national 
                                                 
51 Commission, “Call for Evidence. EU Regulatory Framework for Financial Services” September 2015. 
52 Regulation 648/2012 [2012] OJ L201/1 
53 Commission, “Public Consultation on Regulation EU No 648/2012” (2015).   
54 See, e.g., ESMA, “Advice on the Application of the AIFMD Passport to non EU Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers and Funds” (ESMA/2016/1140 and ESMA/2015/1230).  
55 HM Treasury, “Response to the EU Commission: Call for Evidence on EU Regulatory Framework for 
Financial Services”, February 2016. 
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supervisors currently have in relation to the imposition of additional capital requirements on 
banks (the CRD IV ‘pillar 2’ requirements).  The weakened UK voice means that opposition to 
greater harmonization and EU calibration of international standards may be less strong in the 
Council than it was over the original CRD IV negotiations.  Conversely, while the UK can be 
expected to support the proposal to lift certain of the contested CRD IV remuneration rules from 
smaller and less complex firms, other Member States may be less accommodating and more 
influential.   
Finally, the absence/weakened influence of the UK may shape the current debate on how 
the proportionality principle should apply. A tempering of the application of financial market 
rules by means of a proportionality assessment is a common feature of the single rulebook. The 
contested remuneration requirements (including the famous ‘bonus cap’) which apply to banks 
under CRD IV, for example, are to apply ‘in a manner and to the extent that is appropriate to 
[relevant firms’] size, internal organisation and the nature, scope, and complexity of their 
activities’ (Article 92(2)). A similar requirement applies to the extensive organizational 
requirements which apply to investment firms under MiFID II (Article 16). But while 
proportionality clauses provide a means for addressing regulatory stalemates during negotiations, 
and for reducing the risk of unintended consequences, they can also generate risks to the single 
market. These include divergent rule application, regulatory arbitrage, transaction costs, and the 
imposition of national preferences. The appropriate application of the proportionality principle 
has recently come to preoccupy the EU institutions as the costs and unintended consequences of 
the crisis-era reforms emerge. The European Parliament’s 2016 Balz Resolution on the 
Commission’s ‘stock take’, for example, underlined that EU financial legislation should be 
proportionate and highlighted a number of areas where it had disproportionate effects.56 
Similarly, its 2016 Resolution on Banking Union called on the ECB to ensure its supervisory 
strategies within the SSM complied with the proportionality principle.57 While there seems to be 
considerable support within the EU institutions for an appropriately proportionate application of 
rules, the absence of the UK58 may diminish the importance of the debate and ease pressure for 
reform. 
                                                 
56 European Parliament, “Stocktaking and Challenges of EU Financial Services Regulation”, 19 January 
2016 (P8_TA(2015)0268) (Balz Resolution). 
57 European Parliament, “Resolution on Banking Union – Annual Report (2015)”, 10 March 2016 (P8_TA-
PROV(2016)0093). 
58 HM Treasury’s response to the Commission ‘stock take’, e.g., highlights difficulties with the 
proportionate application of: financial reporting rules to smaller firms; capital requirements to smaller 
banks; and financial rules more generally to non-financial counterparties. 
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One final speculation on regulatory reform can be offered. The possibility that EU 
financial regulation will come to include euro area ‘location’ requirements - requiring that certain 
trading and other business in euro instruments be carried out in the euro area -  cannot be entirely 
discounted. It is all the more likely to transpire if single market and euro area interests come to be 
more closely aligned after Brexit. At the least, the EU institutions (including the ECB) and many 
Member States are unlikely to be disinterested with respect to the continuing concentration of 
some one-third of all euro-denominated trading occurring outside the EU in the UK (whether 
their interest is driven by financial stability or competitive concerns).59 The extent to which the 
UK, as a third country, would be protected from such rules by WTO requirements, and, from the 
EU perspective, the extent to which the trade law ‘prudential carve out’ (which provides that 
states (and the EU) cannot be prevented by trade agreement commitments from applying rules for 
prudential purposes), will likely be tested by any such reform.60 
Overall, the absence of the UK from EU financial regulation is not likely to lead to major 
changes in the medium term, although the regime is likely to become more, and not less, 
interventionist over time. The major influence on the development of EU financial regulation in 
the future is likely to be the international standard setters. Much of EU financial regulation has 
been shaped by the international standard setting bodies, such as the Financial Stability Board, 
and it will continue to be so.61 The EU is also likely to be acutely sensitive post Brexit to the 
competitive position of EU firms internationally, particularly given current indications of large-
scale deregulation in the US.62 For example, while the Commission in its November 2016 
package of banking regulation reforms has proposed refinements to recent Basel Committee 
standards to reflect EU market features, it has also proposed a more onerous regime for third 
country financial firms operating in the EU, requiring that they establish an EU-regulated holding 
company in some circumstances.63  
                                                 
59 Media reports have frequently referenced some support in the EU to repatriate euro trading and clearing 
business to the euro area. See, e.g., G. Parker, “May poised to unveil more Brexit plan details” Financial 
Times, 8 November 2016.  
60 On the relationship between EU financial regulation and trade law/agreements see A. Lang and C. 
Conyers “Financial Services in EU Trade Agreements”, Study for the ECON Committee (2014) 
IP/A/ECON/2014-08.  
61 N. Moloney, “International Financial Governance, the EU, and Brexit: the agencification of EU financial 
governance and the implications” (2016) 17 European Business Organization Law Review 451. 
62 Some reports have indicated that following the November US election significant deregulation may 
follow, including repeal of some elements of the US crisis era Dodd Frank Act: J. Hamilton and E. 
Dexheimer, “Trump’s Transition Team Pledges to Dismantle Dodd Frank”, Bloomberg 10 November 2016. 
63 This proposal has been interpreted as a ‘tit for tat’ measure following the adoption by the US of a similar 
rule: A. Barker and J. Brunsden, “EU to retaliate against US bank capital rules” Financial Times, 21 
November 2016. 
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But while changes in regulatory substance are more likely to be at the margins given that 
EU regulation sits in an international market, a more interventionist approach overall can be 
expected. So too can an ever-more harmonized approach. The ECB, for example, has been 
leading the charge to remove ‘national options and discretions’ from the banking rulebook, at 
least in relation to the SSM zone;64 the CMU agenda is in part designed to deliver greater 
harmonization, including in relation to areas not traditionally harmonized, such as insolvency 
law; and the November 2016 package of banking regulation reforms reduces Member State and 
national supervisory discretion. In the absence of the UK and its support for national discretion, 
more, and not less, harmonization can be expected.  
 
Supervisory/Institutional Governance and Brexit: the ascendancy of the euro area? 
Brexit will remove one of the prominent frictions slowing the further integration of institutional 
governance for the EU financial system. With respect to euro area institutional integration, the 
UK did not obstruct the Banking Union institutional reforms and indeed supported them as a 
means of strengthening the financial stability of the euro area.65 But the UK/EU negotiations prior 
to the February 2016 New Settlement made clear the UK’s increasing unease as to the consequent 
risks from Banking Union of an intensification of euro area caucusing; of euro area interests 
coming to shape single market financial governance; and of pressure for greater institutional 
centralization. The New Settlement accordingly promised a political brake in relation to further 
euro-area integration (including institutional centralization). It also contained an affirmation that 
financial stability measures taken in relation to financial institutions and markets would, for non-
euro-area Member States, remain at national level. These commitments were designed to address 
the UK’s concern that the Banking Union structures might be replicated for the capital markets in 
the euro area, in the first instance, and might ultimately lead to single-market-wide financial 
supervisory authorities for the capital markets and to a related loss of national autonomy over 
supervision. Given this posture on institutional reform, the UK could have been expected to resist 
further euro area institutional integration, particularly with respect to capital market supervision. 
In addition, any attempt to design risk-sharing institutional structures for the wider single market 
would likely have been fiercely resisted by the UK.  
The withdrawal of the UK does not necessarily imply, however, that new 
supervisory/resolution structures and institutions designed to support risk sharing (on the lines of 
                                                 
64 Regulation (EU) 2016/445 of the ECB [2016] OJ L78/60 and ECB Banking Supervision, “ECB Guide on 
Options and Discretions Available in Union Law” (2016). 
65 See House of Lords EU Committee, “European Banking Union: key issues and challenges” Seventh 
Report of Session 2012-13, 12 December 2012. 
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the SSM and SRM) are likely to appear for the capital markets or the insurance markets over the 
medium term – whether for the euro area or the single market. Some straws in the wind could be 
read as auguring change, notably the 2015 Five Presidents’ Report’s call for a ‘Financial Union’ 
for the euro area, and the ECB’s support for centralized capital market supervision for the euro 
area.66 Similarly, in its September 2016 CMU report the Commission suggested, in the context of 
the Five Presidents’ Report, that ‘further steps’ relating to the EU supervisory framework were to 
be considered, so that the full potential of CMU could be reached.67   
In practice (and whether for the euro area or single market) the political, institutional, 
technical, and constitutional obstacles are immense68 and include: the persistent and significant 
differences in the structure of capital and other markets across the euro area/single market and the 
related political difficulties associated with building a consensus on risk-sharing; Treaty 
competence difficulties; and the immense functional challenge posed by the design of a 
supervisory and resolution mechanism or mechanisms which could deliver supervision and rescue 
for a vast and heterogeneous population of financial market actors, ranging from systemically 
significant multi-function financial groups and financial market infrastructures, to small financial 
advisers and non-financial counterparties active in the financial system. These challenges are 
independent of the political challenges posed by the UK’s opposition.  
There are also indications that, as Banking Union’s risk-sharing structures embed (and 
even though initial institutional reaction to the SSM and SRM appears to be broadly positive69), 
there is more rather than less discomfort with risk-sharing and with related institution-building. 
The Commission’s 2015 report on Banking Union called for Banking Union to be completed, 
most notably by means of, first, a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) and, second, the 
‘common fiscal backstop,’ as noted above.70 Institutional reaction to such further reforms has 
been relatively cool. Indications from the European Parliament suggest that, prior to the 
construction of an EDIS for Banking Union, significantly more effort needs to be expended on 
the adoption of ex-ante legislative risk control/reduction measures for the single market 
                                                 
66 See recently ECB, 2016 Financial Integration Report, p. 97. in which the ECB noted its preference for a 
‘single European capital markets supervisor’ and similarly, ECB, “Building a Capital Markets Union – 
Eurosystem Contribution to the European Commission’s Green Paper” (2015).  
67 Commission, Accelerating CMU, p. 7. 
68 See further N. Moloney, “Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union: Incrementalism or a ‘Big 
Bang’?”  (2016) European Company and Financial Law Review 376. 
69 E.g., European Parliament, 2016 Resolution on Banking Union and ECOFIN Council, Banking Union 
Roadmap Conclusions. The recent report from the European Court of Auditors, however, is more mixed, 
and raises concerns with respect to, e.g., staffing levels, over reliance on national supervisors, and access to 
documents: European Court of Auditors, “Single Supervisory Mechanism – Good start but further 
improvements needed” (Special Report No 29/2016). 
70 Commission, Communication, “Towards the Completion of the Banking Union” COM(2015) 587 final. 
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generally.71 The Council’s reaction to EDIS has been similarly muted; it has linked progress on 
EDIS to the strengthening of ex-ante risk reduction measures.72 Movement on the ‘common fiscal 
backstop’ for Banking Union is also sluggish. While the euro area Member States have agreed to 
bilaterally support their individual national funding compartments within the SRM’s Single 
Resolution Fund through national credit lines,73 progress on the mutualized, common fiscal 
backstop needed to complete Banking Union is slow.74   
If the euro area struggles with the further risk mutualization needed to complete the 
already-established Banking Union, it is highly unlikely that new adventures in risk-sharing in the 
euro area insurance and capital markets segments will be pursued – and even more unlikely that 
new single market institutions will be contemplated. This is all the more the case as the list of 
pending legislative risk reduction measures, which the Commission has committed to pursuing, is 
long and includes matters which are both technically complex and politically sensitive. These 
include further harmonization of national deposit insurance schemes across the single market and 
review of the regulatory treatment of sovereign debt.75  
This is not to suggest that the UK’s withdrawal will have no effect on current institutional 
arrangements. The most likely impact will be on single market institutional governance, which is 
currently primarily coordination-based. In particular, a strengthening of the European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) may follow.  The ESAs, within the single market ESFS, carry out a range of 
quasi-regulatory and supervisory co-ordination functions. The UK has been a strong supporter of 
the ESAs’ quasi-regulatory activities,76 which include advising the Commission on administrative 
rules, proposing Binding Technical Standards (a form of administrative rule) for adoption by the 
Commission, and adopting Guidelines. But the UK has typically not been supportive of the 
conferral of direct, executive powers on the ESAs, regarding supervision as a Member State 
competence. It has, for example, taken a restrictive approach to the interpretation of the binding 
mediation power conferred on the ESAs by Article 19 of their founding Regulations, which 
empowers the ESAs to impose a binding decision on national supervisory authorities who are in 
conflict. The UK has argued that, given the Meroni prohibition on the exercise of wide executive 
                                                 
71 European Parliament, ECON Committee, “Working Document on a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme”, 16 June 2016.  
72 ECOFIN Council, Banking Union Roadmap Conclusions. 
73 The different national funding ‘pots’ within the SRM which are available to support rescue and 
resolution are, however, being progressively mutualised over an eight-year period. At the end of the eight 
years the pots will be fully mutualised into one fund and thus the national credit lines provided are limited 
as they apply to progressively dwindling national pots. 
74 ECOFIN Council, Banking Union Roadmap Conclusions. 
75 Commission, 2016 Completing Banking Union, pp. 9-11. 
76 E.g., HM Treasury, “Response to the Commission Services Consultation on the Review of the ESFS” 
(2013). 
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discretion by EU agencies, national supervisory discretion which is exercised in accordance with 
EU law cannot be overridden by an ESA.77 Given that EU financial regulation is increasingly 
adopting an operational posture and focusing closely on the implementation and supervision of 
the crisis-era reforms,78 it is not unlikely that Article 19, which allows an ESA to cut through 
practical differences which may arise between national supervisors on the application of EU law, 
may be revisited.  Similarly, it is no longer politically improbable that the ESAs could become 
vehicles through which additional supervisory powers are transferred to the single market level. 
Thus far, only very limited supervisory powers have been conferred on the ESAs,79 but this may 
change although, as noted below, there are significant environmental frictions. 
Brexit may also have the effect of strengthening the ESAs’ regulatory capacity, or their 
ability to achieve outcomes, more generally. The ability and appetite of the ESAs to deploy their 
primarily soft coordination/convergence powers more assertively (including their powers to adopt 
Guidelines for national supervisors and to engage in peer review of national supervisors) may 
therefore be strengthened. An incremental hardening of supervisory convergence and 
coordination, and more central steering of national supervisors by the ESAs, might follow. This 
strengthening of regulatory capacity and credibility could follow from the ESAs’ competences in 
relation to third -country access to the EU single market and the related equivalence assessments.  
The nature of the settlement which will govern the UK’s relationship with the EU is not 
yet clear. But it is likely that it will require some form of third-country access arrangement, and a 
related assessment, accordingly, of the ‘equivalence’ of UK financial regulation, supervision, and 
enforcement with EU requirements. A number of potential flashpoints relating to the UK/EU 
equivalence assessment can be identified. As financial regulation is highly dynamic, UK and EU 
financial regulation can be expected to diverge over time. In addition, equivalence determinations 
relating to supervision and enforcement are notoriously elusive given the multiplicity of factors 
which shape states’ supervisory and enforcement approaches as well as the difficulties in 
                                                 
77 The UK supported the insertion of a recital into the European Supervisory Authority regulations which 
provides that where the relevant EU legislation at issue in an art. 19 binding mediation confers discretion 
on national supervisory authorities, any related decision taken by an Authority cannot replace the exercise 
in compliance with EU law of that discretion (e.g., ESMA Regulation 1095/2010 [2010] OJ L331/84, 
recital 32).  
78 As is clear from the CMU agenda which emphasizes the importance of convergence in supervisory 
practices: Commission, CMU Action Plan, p. 27.  
79 ESMA has exclusive supervisory and enforcement powers over rating agencies and trade repositories, 
and can intervene in relation to short selling activity, while ESMA and EBA will be empowered to prohibit 
certain products once the relevant legislation comes into force.  
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quantifying supervisory and enforcement outcomes.80 Finally, as currently designed, the EU 
equivalence arrangements typically leave the equivalence determination to the Commission’s 
discretion, there are few procedural protections for third countries who seek such an assessment 
(the Commission is not, for example, required to undertake an assessment at the request of a third 
country but retains discretion81), and equivalence decisions can be withdrawn. 
These uncertainties increase the importance and political sensitivity of any future UK/EU 
equivalence determinations and of the mechanism(s) deployed to reach such determinations. 
While the Commission is currently the decision-maker with respect to equivalence, the ESAs, to 
differing extents, are/can be charged with advising the Commission on the different types of 
equivalence determinations required across EU financial regulation.82 The most extensive 
functions are conferred on ESMA which has played a central role in advising the Commission on 
the equivalence of third country regimes internationally, including in relation to access by third 
country credit rating agencies, alternative investment funds, and central clearing counterparties 
(CCPs), and with respect to financial reporting. Advice to the Commission on equivalence 
determinations can place ESMA in politically challenging territory given the market and political 
sensitivities.83 But providing such advice to the Commission also affords ESMA significant 
opportunities to strengthen its capacity and credibility given the technical competence, 
international financial diplomacy, and deft institutional politicking which these determinations 
require.84  
The opportunities for ESMA will be all the greater on Brexit. The equivalence 
requirements relating to investment services and to the trading of financial instruments, which are 
governed by the MiFID II/MiFIR regime, are likely to be of acute importance to UK/EU relations 
post Brexit. MiFIR Article 46, to take one example, allows a third country firm to provide 
services from the third country to professional investors in the EU without EU authorization and 
                                                 
80 H. Jackson, “Substituted Compliance: The Emergence, Challenges, and Evolution of a New Regulatory 
Paradigm” 1 (2) Journal of Financial Regulation (2015) 169. For a policy perspective see Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission, Regulatory Guide 54 (2012).  
81 See, e.g., MiFIR, recital 41. 
82 The different legislative measures of EU financial regulation take varying approaches to third country 
access, although the most recent crisis-era reforms typically require that some form of equivalence 
determination is made by the Commission. All the Authorities are charged under their founding regulations 
with assisting in the preparation of equivalence decisions (e.g. ESMA Regulation, art. 33).   
83 The CCP equivalence discussions with the US were difficult and were only completed after high level 
EU/US political intervention, following which the Commission ruled in March 2016 that US regulation of 
CCPs was equivalent for the purpose of EU market access. 
84 As is clear from, e.g., ESMA’s advice on the equivalence of third country CCP regulatory regimes. 
ESMA’s technical advice on the Australian regime was detailed, technical, reviewed supervision as well as 
regulation, and involved engagement with the relevant Australian regulators (ESMA/2013/BS/1159). 
ESMA’s advice was followed by the Commission which subsequently adopted an equivalence decision 
(2014/755/EU). 
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related regulation, once a Commission determination of equivalence is made (and other 
conditions met). ESMA will likely be required to provide ‘technical advice’ to the Commission 
on the related and highly sensitive equivalence decision. The importance of the MiFID II/MiFIR 
equivalence regime to EU/UK relations is not limited to market access. It also shapes how EU 
financial actors interact with third country actors, and thus has serious implications for the UK as 
a third country. For example, while MiFID II/MiFIR requires certain instruments to be traded on 
EU trading venues, a third country venue (such as a UK trading venue) can be used once an 
equivalence decision has been made; in the absence of such a decision, UK trading venues would 
risk losing trading business. Assuming that the third country equivalence route forms part of the 
post-Brexit access arrangements between the UK and the EU, ESMA will play a critical role in 
the management of the UK/EU relationship.  
The provision of equivalence-related advice is, of course, only one of ESMA’s extensive 
(albeit primarily ‘soft’) competences. But at a time when there is some uncertainty as to the future 
of institutional governance for the EU financial market, and when the ESAs are under review 
more generally,85 advising on the UK’s equivalence status is likely to strengthen ESMA’s 
position more generally. There are already signs that ESMA sees equivalence determinations as a 
means for strengthening its institutional position; it has called for reforms to the third country 
regime for CCPs under EMIR, for example, which would strengthen its position.86  
Further opportunities may arise. There are indications that the Commission will review 
the current equivalence regime with a view to bringing more coherence to an unwieldy set of 
rules.87 As Ferran has argued, there is a logic to the adoption of a more streamlined, ‘single point 
of access’ arrangement (not least given the incentives for the EU to signal its openness to the 
international market post Brexit) and, in the absence of the UK, the Commission and the co-
legislators may find it easier to come to an agreed position.88 Any new arrangement may well 
draw heavily on ESMA (and the other ESAs) given their proven technical capacity in this area. 
Whether or not such an incremental strengthening of the ESAs is functionally optimal is 
outside the scope of this discussion. It can be suggested, however, that change of this nature is 
more likely to have effects at the margins and is not – in the absence of other environmental 
changes (whether political, market, or institutional) – likely to lead to a radical change to the 
current coordination-based nature of the ESAs’ activities. Certainly, current institutional 
                                                 
85 A Commission Green Paper is expected in 2017. 
86 ESMA, EMIR Review Report No. 4 (ESMA/2015/1254). 
87 See A. Barber and R. Brunsden “EU Review”. 
88 E. Ferran, “The UK as a Third Country”. 
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conditions are not favourable to significant change.89 The Commission has long been concerned 
to assert its primacy over the ESAs, while the Parliament is increasingly seeking greater 
oversight.90 From the Member State perspective, while Brexit removes the UK and its often 
sceptical posture towards the ESAs, Germany, for example, is unlikely to support a significant 
increase in their powers.91 
Brexit may have more far-reaching effects for EBA. EBA is currently situated within a 
complex institutional ecosystem. Its sphere of activities is in theory distinct from that of the ECB 
within the SSM (the ECB/SSM). EBA is charged with supporting the single market rulebook and 
with single market supervisory convergence/coordination; its jurisdiction is the single market in 
banking. The jurisdiction of the ECB/SSM is Banking Union; the ECB/SSM is the operational 
supervisor for banks within Banking Union, having oversight of the SSM and direct supervisory 
responsibility for 129 of the euro area’s most significant banking groups. Nonetheless, the 
potential for the ECB to encroach into EBA’s single market and convergence/coordination 
territory cannot be ignored. This potential is likely to increase on Brexit given the weakening of 
EBA’s institutional position which may follow from a closer alignment of the membership of the 
single market and of the euro area/Banking Union.  
There are currently nine EBA members who are not members of the euro area or 
voluntary participants in Banking Union; this will be reduced to eight on the exit of the UK.  
Whether or not the single market interest which EBA is charged with supporting will become 
subsumed within the SSM/Banking Union interest, and thereby lead to related calls for a change 
to EBA’s role, will depend to a large extent on whether or not those eight members become 
members of the SSM and Banking Union. There are incentives for the ‘pre-in’ euro area Member 
States to join the SSM/Banking Union ahead of time, but there are also considerable counter-
incentives.92 At present only Denmark has made a clear statement of intent with respect to joining 
Banking Union,93 although other non-euro-area Member States are supportive.94 There is, of 
                                                 
89 In the context of ESMA see N. Moloney, “Institutional Governance and Capital Markets Union”. 
90 Balz Resolution. 
91 In February 2016 the Bundestag adopted a resolution which calls for the German federal government to 
ensure adequate scrutiny of the ESAs. It has also stated that where ESA Guidelines do not correspond to 
the Bundestag’s objectives they should not be adopted in Germany. Centre for European Policy, “European 
Supervisory Authorities. Room for Improvement at Level 2 and 3.” Study on Behalf of the fpmi Munich 
Financial Centre Initiative (2016) p. 42. 
92 See E. Ferran, “European Banking Union and the Single Financial Market: More Differentiated 
Integration or Disintegration?”, University of Cambridge, Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 
26/2014, SSRN, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426580 [Accessed 24 November 2016]. 
93 The Danish central bank called for Denmark to join Banking Union in 2014: Danish Nationalbank, 
“Danish Participation in the Banking Union” (2014) 4th Quarter Danmark’s Nationalbank Monetary 
Review, 41. This was followed by a positive report from the Ministry of Business and Growth in May 2015 
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course, a temporal inevitability with respect to the alignment of the single banking market and the 
SSM/Banking Union zone: the ‘pre-ins’ must, over time, join the euro (and Banking Union) as 
they meet the relevant conditions. Further, if only one or two more Member States either join the 
euro or choose to participate in the SSM/Banking Union, network effects are likely to develop 
which make the case for SSM/Banking Union participation more compelling. This will be all the 
more the case if the reputation of the ECB in relation to the SSM is not, in the meantime, 
damaged. In addition, the ‘double-lock’ which protects non-SSM/Banking Union Member States 
within EBA from SSM/Banking Union caucusing is to be reviewed when the number of non-
SSM Member States drops to four (2010 EBA Regulation, Article 81a). But even if there is 
greater alignment between the members of the single market and of the SSM/Banking Union, it 
does not necessarily follow that the ECB/SSM will take over EBA’s functions and that EBA will 
become redundant. 
The ECB/SSM serves a different function to EBA. The ECB’s competences are 
operational and supervisory in nature and cover the euro area. EBA’s competences are quasi-
regulatory and directed to supervisory coordination, and cover the wider single market. In 
addition, EBA’s mandate is wider than that of the ECB’s. EBA’s mandate covers convergence 
and coordination in relation to consumer protection,95 market conduct, and financial crime (as 
well as prudential regulation). It also extends beyond credit institutions to include financial 
institutions more generally.96 By contrast, the mandate of the ECB/SSM is limited to prudential 
supervision of credit institutions.   
It is not, of course, impossible that the ECB’s competences will be extended in the future 
to match those of EBA by a Treaty revision. The ECB could be empowered to supervise directly 
a range of institutions, across the single market, and with respect to prudential, conduct, and 
financial crime regulation, and consumer protection, leaving EBA redundant.  The more likely 
outcome, however, is that the risks of creating such a vastly powerful institution are likely to 
minimize political, institutional, and market support for such a change - leaving to one side the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and a related supportive statement from two government ministers: Press Release, Ministry of Business and 
Growth, 11 May 2015. 
94 Bulgaria and Romania have indicated their support while the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are 
adopting more a sceptical or ‘wait and see’ approach: P. Hüttl and D. Schoenmaker, “Should the ‘outs’ join 
the European Banking Union?” CEPS Policy Contribution, Issue 2016/3, February 2016.  
95 It coordinated with ESMA and EIOPA, e.g., on the development of the administrative rules for the 
consumer-focused Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs) regime: ESMA, 
EBA, EIOPA, “Final Draft RTSs” (JC 2016 21) (2016). 
96 It has recently been charged with advising the Commission in relation to prudential requirements for 
investment firms: EBA, “Report on Investment Firms” (EBA/Op/2015/20(2015).  
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functional difficulties. As outlined above, there is limited appetite for completing the Banking 
Union project; a massive increase in the powers of ECB/SSM is unlikely. 
Nonetheless, EBA’s role may change somewhat on Brexit if single market financial 
governance interests become more closely aligned with those of the euro area, and if the 
gravitational pull of the ECB/SSM becomes stronger.  EBA will have strong institutional 
incentives to emphasize its distinctive role and its separation from the ECB. It is likely to 
prioritize accordingly those areas of its mandate where there is limited overlap with the ECB.  In 
particular, it might become more focused on conduct and on consumer protection. There are 
already some straws in the wind in this regard. EBA has included conduct risk among the risks 
which EU banking supervisors must include in their annual supervisory review (SREP) of EU 
banks.97 Consumer protection is also receiving closer attention, including through research and 
Guidelines98 as well as through EBA’s supervisory agenda for banks.99 
 Further evidence as to the likely persistence of EBA comes from the reality that, unlike 
the ECB, EBA is embedded into the EU administrative law-making process as the technical 
adviser to the Commission on delegated rules and as the proposer of Binding Technical 
Standards. Although tensions periodically arise, EBA has developed productive relationships with 
the European Parliament, Council, and Commission in relation to delegated rule-making. It is not 
at all clear that these institutions would substitute EBA - which, as an agency, has a constrained 
operating environment which limits its competences as a rule-maker and which allows the 
institutions to exert significant oversight powers - for a mighty ECB. The constitutional 
conundrums which any such transfer of functions relating to delegated rule-making would pose 
would also be significant. Assuming that the ECB were to be conferred with EBA’s functions in 
relation to administrative rules, it is not clear how, to take only one example, the ECB’s 
independence guarantee could be met in a situation where the ECB, proposing administrative 
rules or providing technical advice (as EBA currently is charged to do), was subject to 
endorsement by the Commission, and to oversight by the European Parliament and Council.  
While prediction is a fraught business, the impact of Brexit on institutional governance, 
in the medium term at least, is likely to be incremental. The safest prediction is for a gradual 
strengthening of the ESAs and for a related intensification of supervisory convergence and 
                                                 
97 EBA, “Guidelines on Common Procedures and Methodologies for the Supervisory Review and 
Evaluation Process” (EBA/GL/2014/13) (2014).   
98 E.g., EBA, “Consumer Trends Report” (2016) and EBA, “Guidelines on Product Oversight and 
Governance Arrangements for Retail Banking Products” (EBA/GL/2015/18). 
99 EBA has included mis-selling risks among the risks to be considered by bank supervisors in stress 
testing: EBA, “EU-Wide Stress Test. Methodological Note” (2016), chapter five. 
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coordination – a process which is already underway. Functionally, this might be the lowest 
impact but also lowest risk outcome. 
 
Conclusion 
This discussion considers the implications for EU financial governance of the UK’s withdrawal 
from the EU. A degree of regulatory and institutional change can be expected although the 
quantum is elusive.  
Regulatory effects are likely to include the emergence of a more interventionist approach 
to financial regulation. This may colour the ongoing review of the crisis-era single rulebook as 
well as the current negotiations on CMU and on banking regulation reform. But major change is 
unlikely. International financial governance and international competitiveness remain major 
influences on the EU regime, as is clear from the current discussions on the ‘Basel IV’ reforms to 
banking regulation underway at the Basel Committee and the EU’s concern to shape these 
reforms.100 
It is more difficult to predict the likely implications for the institutional structures which 
support supervision and enforcement in the EU financial market. This discussion suggests that, in 
the medium term, a strengthening of the credibility and capacity of the ESAs within the single 
market is likely to be the most probable outcome. But Brexit is not the only or even the main 
determinant of how the current institutional structures will evolve. The future shape of EU/single 
market and euro-area institutional financial governance will depend to a significant extent on the 
political climate, and on the outcome of the 2017 parliamentary elections across the EU. 
Similarly, much depends on how the euro area develops, and on whether political (and market) 
conditions, in the EU and globally, lead to support for further intensification of fiscal and 
regulatory policy within the euro-area zone and to an alignment, ultimately, between the single 
market and the euro area.   In addition, whether or not the EU banking market can grow and 
address persistent balance sheet weaknesses in the prevailing low interest rate environment, and 
with the growing challenge from ‘fintech’ is, in the short term at least, likely to be of greater 
significance for the shape of EU financial governance than Brexit.  
If political, market, and institutional conditions become favourable, a more far-reaching 
re-shaping of current institutional arrangements may follow. In an attempt to strengthen the EU 
27 market, and to communicate the resilience of EU financial governance post Brexit, some 
largely cosmetic institutional re-ordering may follow the UK’s withdrawal. For example, the silo-
                                                 
100 B. Groendahl and A. Migliaccio, “Europe Said to Threaten Revolt over Bank Capital Rue Revamp”, 
Bloomberg, 15 September 2016. 
23 
 
based organization of the three single market ESAs (securities (ESMA), banking (EBA), and 
insurance/pensions (EIOPA)) is not functionally optimal given the cross-sectoral nature of the EU 
financial system.  A ‘twin peaks’ model, based on a single market European Conduct Authority 
(for all sectors) and a European Prudential Authority (for all sectors), and concerned with 
supervisory coordination and the development of the single rulebook, might be a logical ‘next 
step.’ Assuming the two new authorities were based on an agency model, such a reform would 
also sidestep the most difficult of the constitutional and functional questions raised by 
institutional reform. These single-market-oriented, coordination-based authorities would be 
required to sit alongside the distinct supervisory/operational structures of Banking Union. But the 
EU now has considerable experience with complex institutional ecosystems in the financial 
sphere. Whether or not such coordination-based structures could evolve to ‘full-blown’ direct 
operational supervisors for the single market (assuming the distinct existence of the euro area) is 
difficult to predict – even assuming a functional case could be made.  
Brexit will lead to change, but it is likely to be at the margins of EU financial 
governance. How EU political conditions internally and international trade relations externally 
develop, at a time of uncertainty in geopolitics, is likely to have greater salience for the future 
development of EU financial governance.   
